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 DRAFTING AN EFFECTIVE GREENMAIL PROHIBITION
 RonaldJ. Gilson*
 Hostile tender offers have become a recurrent political issue. In
 recent years Congress has held seemingly endless hearings on the sub-
 ject, and by now the testimony has settled into a familiar dialogue. Po-
 tential acquirers cast themselves as the embodiment of Adam Smith's
 invisible hand-their activities energize the market for corporate con-
 trol with the desirable result of improving the efficiency of corporate
 management. Management of potential targets, in turn, claim the role
 of Albert Chandler's visible hand-efficient managers who internalize a
 function previously carried out by an inefficient market.' Their argu-
 ment is that because the market for corporate control systematically un-
 derstates companies' intrinsic values, managers must displace the
 market to prevent underpriced acquisitions.
 Although the terms of the debate are cast in the language of effi-
 ciency, as with most serious political issues, much of the real substance
 is distributional. Even those who genuinely believe that hostile take-
 overs improve allocative efficiency will concede that some groups still
 suffer in the process. Their point goes no further than the claim that,
 after netting out the gains (to, for example, target shareholders) and
 the losses (to, for example, laid-off middle management and local
 communities), hostile takeovers still yield a positive result. A substan-
 tial amount of the conflict in Congress, as well as within and between
 states, is over who reaps the gains and who bears the costs of takeovers,
 whatever their net social impact.2
 Out of this political maelstrom, one element of virtual consensus
 has emerged: greenmail-target management paying a potential ac-
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 1. A. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Busi-
 ness (1977).
 2. This suggests that efforts by states to restrict hostile takeovers reflect the fact
 that, in those states, the potential injury to domestic interests from hostile takeovers
 through plant closings, relocation of executive offices, the loss of jobs and the like, ex-
 ceeds the potential gain to domestic shareholders and the overall positive impact on the
 state from improved economic efficiency resulting from an active market for corporate
 control. See R. Gilson, The Law and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 1059-60
 (1986); Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 111,
 138-41 (1987). Then-Professor Lehn and ProfessorJones provide some empirical sup-
 port for this thesis. Their study shows that the location of target firms' headquarters was
 highly correlated with a Senator's introduction of federal antitakeover legislation. K.
 Lehn &J. Jones, The Legislative Politics of Hostile Corporate Takeovers 22 (Mar. 19,
 1987) (paper presented at a Conference in Political Economy and Business, Washington
 University, St. Louis, Mo.)
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 quirer to go away by repurchasing his shares at a premium-is bad.3
 Given the terms of the political debate, it is not surprising that broad
 support has developed for prohibiting greenmail. It is the only aspect
 of the hostile takeover phenomenon that is seen as a threat by both
 sides of the debate. From the perspective of the protakeover forces,
 greenmail is just another, albeit more blatant, technique by which
 target management entrenches itself at the expense of target share-
 holders. Prohibiting the payment at least eliminates this form of en-
 3. The consensus is not, however, complete. Some managers simply resist any re-
 duction in the range of available defensive responses to hostile takeovers. Warranting
 more serious attention, however, are two types of progreenmail arguments-conceptual
 and empirical-advanced by academic advocates. The conceptual argument, best stated
 by Professors Schliefer and Vishny, is based on a model in which paying greenmail may
 serve as a credible signal to potential alternative bidders that an opportunity is available
 that warrants attention. From this perspective, attracting competitive bidding is desira-
 ble because it results in a higher price. In addition to the information content of the
 greenmail payment, the argument runs, the greenmail payment eliminates the initial
 bidder who, because of its existing low cost stake in the target, would be at a significant
 competitive advantage in any bidding contest. Rather than preventing the target's take-
 over, in this view eliminating the initial bidder by paying greenmail is necessary to cause
 a takeover to occur at a more favorable price. Schliefer & Vishny, Greenmail, White
 Knights, and Shareholders' Interest, 17 Rand J. Econ. 293 (1986).
 The difficulty with this model is that it does not take into account the conflict of
 interest between management and shareholders. Even if greenmail can serve the pur-
 pose of attracting competitive bids, it still can be used by less loyal management as a
 defensive tactic. The upshot is that, unless we can devise a means to distinguish "good"
 from "bad" greenmail, the value of greenmail depends on its overall impact across all
 cases in which it is paid, a pooling equilibrium problem.
 This is where the empirical argument comes in. The claim, made most directly by
 Professors Macey and McChesney, is that aggregating the results in all cases in which
 greenmail is paid yields a net increase in target shareholder wealth. They note that the
 drop in share value on the announcement of a greenmail payment does not offset all of
 the increase in share value on the announcement of the potential acquirer's initial in-
 vestment. The net increase, they argue, shows that the overall impact of greenmail is
 positive. Macey & McChesney, A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 Yale
 LJ. 13 (1985). For a discussion of the empirical studies on which the argument is based,
 see infra notes 23-26 and accompanying text.
 I have responded to this argument elsewhere by predicting that all of this gain will
 disappear if the company that paid greenmail is not subsequently taken over. R. Gilson,
 supra note 2, at 736-38 (1986). The next generation of empirical studies confirms this
 prediction. These studies show that, on a portfolio basis, the net gain that remains after
 a greenmail payment disappears in the absence of a subsequent successful bid (although
 some companies retain their gains). Mikkelson & Ruback, Targeted Share Repurchases
 and Common Stock Returns 29 (Sloan School of Management Working Paper No. 1707-
 86, Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyJune 1986), and Bhagat &Jefferis, Why Good
 Managers Pay Greenmail: The Economics of Targeted Share Repurchases 51-53 (Uni-
 versity of Utah Graduate School of Business Working Paper, Sept. 1986). Those firms
 that are rapidly taken over by other bidders may have benefited from paying greenmail,
 but this still must be balanced against those firms whose higher share price is completely
 dissipated, leaving the greenmail payment as a loss to shareholders. Thus, we are left
 where we started-without the ability generally to distinguish good greenmail from bad
 greenmail. In this setting, the best approach may be to prohibit greenmail, leaving to
 shareholders the power to authorize its payment in specific cases.
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 trenchment. From the perspective of the antitakeover forces,
 greenmailers are the worst example of exploitive, opportunistic players
 in the market for corporate control, threatening an acquisition that has
 no efficiency justification (and may impose significant costs) simply to
 garner short-term gains. Prohibiting the payment eliminates the incen-
 tive to engage in such exploitive activity in the first place. The unique
 overlap of interests means that both sides can agree on one aspect of
 takeover reform: greenmail should be prohibited.
 My purpose here is not to debate that conclusion but to comment
 on the more prosaic yet nonetheless pressing problem of how to imple-
 ment a prohibition on greenmail. Some states already have adopted
 legislative prohibitions,4 and the takeover legislation now pending in
 Congress also would prohibit the practice.5 Additionally, a significant
 number of corporations have not waited for legislative action, instead
 adopting charter amendments that prohibit the individual corporation
 from paying greenmail.6 The problem is that the efforts to date to pro-
 hibit greenmail are seriously underinclusive because they misunder-
 stand the problem. Indeed, I will make the stronger claim that, rather
 than prohibiting greenmail, existing and proposed prohibitions in fact
 serve to legalize greenmail by creating a safe harbor within which it
 safely can be paid.
 Part I of this essay describes the necessary components of any
 greenmail prohibition, illustrates their relevance to the twin goals of
 4. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. ? 10-1204 (Supp. 1987); Minn. Stat. Ann. ? 302A.553,
 subdivision 3 (West 1987); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 463.512-.516 (Michie 1987); N.Y.
 Bus. Corp. Law ? 513(e) (McKinney 1986); Wisc. Stat. Ann. ? 180.725(5) (West 1987).
 5. See S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. ? 8, 133 Cong. Rec. 7601-02 (1987)
 (Proxmire chief sponsor); H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. ? 5 (1987) (Dingell and
 Markey chief sponsors); see also S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. ? 10, 133 Cong. Rec.
 7668-69 (1987) (Sanford sole sponsor).
 Judicial doctrine has never posed a serious threat to greenmail. Provided a record
 was made, review of directors' action in authorizing the repurchase was reviewed under
 the deferential business judgment rule, with predictable results. See, e.g., Heine v. The
 Signal Companies, 1976-77 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ? 95,898 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Cheffv.
 Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 508, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (1964). The move in Delaware toward
 an intermediate standard of review of defensive tactics, see R. Gilson, The Law and
 Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 110-21 (Supp. 1987), as yet seems not to have re-
 sulted in increased scrutiny of greenmail. See Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536-37 (Del.
 1986). Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court's analysis in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
 leum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985), explicitly relied on the fact that greenmail
 could be paid in concluding that reverse greenmail-a purchase from all shareholders
 except the potential acquirer-was also lawful.
 The one flash of more stringent review is Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 168 Cal. App. 3d
 119, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1985), where the court affirmed a preliminary injunction bar-
 ring a greenmail payment by Disney to Saul Steinberg.
 6. Between 1984 and February 1987, some 70 publicly traded corporations, includ-
 ing, for example, Alcoa, Anheuser-Busch, B.F. Goodrich, Mobil and NYNEX, amended
 their articles of incorporation to add a prohibition of greenmail. Jaenicke, Greenmail:
 Background Report B, Investor Responsibility Research Center, Corporate Governance
 Service B-12 (Feb. 1987).
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 preventing exploitation and management entrenchment, and empha-
 sizes the critical role of the definition of a premium. Drawing on a sub-
 stantial body of empirical research describing the impact on the price of
 a target company's stock of the announcement both of an initial invest-
 ment by a potential acquirer and of the repurchase of that investor's
 stock, this part demonstrates that what has been the most common ap-
 proach to defining a premium-prohibiting only greenmail payments
 that exceed market price at the time of repurchase-is likely to be inef-
 fective and at best serves only as a price control. Part II then evaluates
 three alternative definitions of a greenmail premium that do not pres-
 ent this critical problem. It concludes that equating a premium with the
 existence of investor profit is problematic, that direct statistical mea-
 surement of a greenmail premium is feasible, and that a market-based
 measure that identifies greenmail by the market's response to a stock
 repurchase may be the most effective approach of all. Finally, Part III
 describes how a greenmail prohibition can overcome two general ob-
 jections to a legislative prohibition: that it can always be avoided and
 that a legislative prohibition is inferior to a private ordering solution.
 I. THE NECESSARY COMPONENTS OF A GREENMAIL PROHIBITION:
 THE CENTRAL ROLE OF A PREMIUM
 The standard greenmail prohibition bars, without shareholder ap-
 proval, the non-pro rata premium repurchase of a substantial amount
 of stock from a short-term holder.7 Each component of the prohibi-
 tion-non-pro rata, substantial amount, short term, and premium-is
 designed to distinguish transactions that present the risk of greenmail
 from repurchase transactions that either serve valid corporate purposes
 not involving control, or that, whether desirable from other perspec-
 tives, do not present the risk of greenmail 8
 7. An example is the New York statute, whose substantive terms read as follows:
 (e) No resident domestic corporation which is subject to the provisions of
 section nine hundred twelve of this chapter shall purchase or agree to purchase
 more than ten percent of the stock of the resident domestic corporation from a
 shareholder for more than the market value thereof unless such purchase or
 agreement to purchase is approved by the affirmative vote of the board of di-
 rectors followed by the affirmative vote of the holders of a majority of all out-
 standing shares entitled to vote thereon at a meeting of shareholders unless the
 certificate of incorporation requires a greater percentage of the outstanding
 shares to approve.
 The provisions of this paragraph shall not apply when the resident domes-
 tic corporation offers to purchase shares from all holders of stock or for stock
 which the holder has been the beneficial owner of for more than two years.
 N.Y. Bus. Corp. Act ? 513(e) (McKinney 1986).
 8. The shareholder approval requirement, by contrast, gives shareholders the op-
 tion of authorizing what is explicitly a greenmail payment if they so elect.
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 A. The Non-Pro Rata Component
 The explanation for limiting the prohibition to non-pro rata repur-
 chases is inherent in the reasons for prohibiting greenmail in the first
 place. With respect to the exploitation concern, unless the opportunis-
 tic investor is favored over other shareholders, he has no special incen-
 tive to give up the threatened offer or to make the investment in the
 first place. To be sure, a potential acquirer who forces the target com-
 pany to restructure to defeat his offer9 may still stand to gain a great
 deal, and that may provide an incentive to make the initial investment.
 But a potential acquirer following this strategy can profit only if all
 other shareholders profit. As a result, there is little risk of the opportu-
 nistic, exploitive strategies that motivate the antitakeover forces' oppo-
 sition to greenmail. With respect to the entrenchment concern of
 protakeover forces, pro rata repurchases cannot dissipate a sizeable
 toehold investment, because the participation of other shareholders in
 the repurchase would cause the potential acquirer to remain a substan-
 tial shareholder. Thus, a pro rata repurchase generally does not have
 the entrenchment effect that motivates the protakeover forces' support
 for a greenmail prohibition.10
 Excluding pro rata repurchases from the repurchase prohibition
 also avoids imposing unintended restrictions on other corporate fi-
 nance techniques that do not raise control issues. A pro rata repur-
 chase has the same financial effect as a dividend, and there is no
 corporate governance reason for preferring one method of distributing
 corporate earnings to another.11
 B. The Substantial Amount of Stock and Short- Term Holder Components
 The substantial amount of stock and short-term holder compo-
 nents also operate to exclude from the prohibition transactions that do
 9. See, e.g., Lederman & Goroff, Recapitalization Transactions, 14 Rev. Sec. &
 Commodities Reg. 241 (1986).
 10. That is not to say that pro rata repurchases cannot have an entrenchment effect.
 If both the repurchase and management's prerepurchase holdings are large enough, a
 pro rata repurchase in which management chooses not to participate can increase man-
 agement's stake to the point where they have effective voting control. See, e.g., Nathan
 & Sobel, Corporate Stock Repurchases in the Context of Unsolicited Takeover Bids, 35
 Bus. Law. 1545 (1980). A dual class recapitalization effected by an exchange offer oper-
 ates to entrench management in the same manner. See Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class
 Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 73 Va. L. Rev. 807, 812-13 (1987).
 This aspect of the entrenchment effect of target stock repurchases raises concerns
 over the standard governing defensive tactics generally, rather than undermining the
 political consensus favoring the prohibition of the particular form of entrenchment-
 eliminating a specific potential bidder-resulting from greenmail.
 11. Indeed, most modern state corporation statutes approach the regulation of dis-
 tributions by explicitly treating repurchases and dividends as functional equivalents.
 See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code ? 166 (West Supp. 1987); Model Business Corp. Act Ann.
 ? 6.40 comment 1 (1987).
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 not pose the risk of greenmail. However, they are not equally respon-
 sive to the two concerns, entrenchment and exploitation, whose con-
 vergence explains the political consensus supporting the prohibition.
 Moreover, drafting definitions of these two components is much
 less straightforward than distinguishing pro rata from non-pro rata
 payments.
 1. Conceptual Analysis. - Restricting the prohibition to repurchases
 of substantial amounts of stock12 recognizes that, unless a substantial
 number of shares are held, exploitive behavior of the sort feared by the
 antitakeover forces is an unlikely strategy because the implicit threat is
 too weak and the potential gain from the transaction too small. Simi-
 larly, unless the repurchase is substantial, there is little risk of manage-
 ment entrenchment because control of the company is unlikely to be
 affected by an insubstantial repurchase.13
 Like the non-pro rata requirement, the substantial amount limita-
 tion operates to exclude from the prohibition some repurchase transac-
 tions that serve traditional corporate purposes. For example,
 companies often undertake premium repurchases limited to holders of
 odd lots to reduce shareholder-related expenses, like distribution of
 proxy material and annual and quarterly reports, that are a function of
 the number of shareholders rather than the number of shares owned.
 Without a substantial amount limitation, the prohibition would include
 such repurchases because they are not pro rata. Similarly, in executing
 a repurchase program for general corporate purposes,14 it may be
 12. Existing state greenmail prohibitions are limited to repurchases involving hold-
 ers of at least 5 to 107o of a corporation's outstanding shares. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. ? 10-
 1204A (Supp. 1987) (5%o of shares); Minn. Stat. Ann. ? 302A.553, subdivision 3 (West
 1987) (5%o of shares); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law ? 513(e) (McKinney 1986) (10%o of shares);
 Wis. Stat. Ann. ? 180.725 (West 1987) (3%o of shares). The Nevada statute specifies no
 percentage as it merely authorizes administrative rulemaking regarding greenmail. Nev.
 Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 463.512-.516 (Michie 1987). The proposed federal statutes gener-
 ally have lower thresholds. See S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. ? 8, 133 Cong. Rec.
 7601, 7602 (1987) (Proxmire: 37o of any class of securities); H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st
 Sess. ? 5 (1987) (Dingell-Markey: 3%o of shares); see also S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st
 Sess. ? 10, 133 Cong. Rec. 7668, 7669 (1987) (Sanford: 2.5%o of shares).
 13. Form versus substance problems could be raised here. Suppose a potential ac-
 quirer owned 107o of the target company's outstanding stock. To avoid the substantial
 amount component of the prohibition, a greenmail transaction might be structured as a
 repurchase of only 17o, but at a premium of a size that would have been associated with
 repurchase of the entire block. In turn, the seller would either sign a standstill agree-
 ment or simultaneously sell the remainder of his stock in the market. For a considera-
 tion of the general problem of form versus substance-transactions carefully crafted to
 avoid violating the form of the prohibition while still transgressing its substance-in
 connection with efforts to prohibit greenmail, see infra notes 51-57 and accompanying
 text.
 14. Typical explanations for such programs include acquiring shares so that acqui-
 sitions and stock option plans can be carried out without diluting existing shareholders,
 as well as the belief that the shares are underpriced so that they represent a good invest-
 ment. Put differently, and more consistently with an informationally efficient stock mar-
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 cheaper to purchase blocks of stock from existing holders at a premium
 than to make market purchases or a pro rata offer.15 So long as the
 amounts repurchased are not in the aggregate substantial, such repur-
 chases fall outside the prohibition.
 Limiting the repurchase prohibition only to short-term holders16
 also seeks to exclude transactions that do not pose the risk of green-
 mail. However, unlike the substantial amount limitation, this approach
 looks largely to the exploitation concern of the antitakeover forces and
 not to the entrenchment concern of the protakeover forces. To prevent
 exploitation, the short-term holder component imposes a holding pe-
 riod that must be satisfied before shares may be resold to the company
 at a premium. Here, as in other regulatory regimes where a holding
 period is imposed,17 the need to hold an investment subject to market
 risk for a significant period of time reduces the likelihood that the in-
 vestor has an exploitive motive in making the investment by increasing
 the costs of such a strategy.18
 In contrast, the short-term holder component speaks far less di-
 rectly and effectively to the management entrenchment aspect of the
 consensus supporting the prohibition of greenmail. From this perspec-
 tive, buying off a long-term shareholder presents precisely the same en-
 trenchment concern as buying off a short-term holder. There is no
 particular reason to believe that a long-term holder might not turn out
 ket, the repurchase credibly signals that management possesses favorable private
 information bearing on the value of the company's stock.
 15. News leaks of the market purchases may drive up the price of the stock more
 than the premium to be paid or, indeed, because of blockage-the difficulty of disposing
 of a large amount of stock-a block of stock may be acquired with no premium at all.
 With respect to the alternative of pro rata offers, the cost advantage of block purchases
 is avoidance of the costs of compliance with SEC rules governing issuer repurchases.
 See 17 C.F.R. ? 240.13e-1, -3 to -4, -100 to -101 (1987).
 16. Existing state statutes regulate repurchases involving shares held from two to
 three years. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. ? 10-1204A (Supp. 1987) (shares held under three
 years); Minn. Stat. Ann. ? 302 A.553, subdivision 3 (West 1987) (six months); N.Y. Bus.
 Corp. Act ? 513(e) (McKinney 1986) (two years); Wis. Stat. Ann. ? 180.725(5) (West
 1987) (two years). The Nevada statute merely authorizes administrative rulemaking,
 and hence specifies no holding period. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 463.512-.516 (Michie
 1987). Proposed federal legislation generally is limited to shares held for shorter peri-
 ods. See S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. ? 8, 133 Cong. Rec. 7601-02 (1987) (Proxmire
 bill: six months); H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., ? 5 (1987) (Dingell-Markey: two
 years); see also S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. ? 10, 133 Cong. Rec. 7668-69 (1987)
 (Sanford: one year).
 17. Both Rules 144 and 145 under the Securities Act of 1933 use the requirement
 of a holding period before resale of securities acquired, respectively, in a private offering
 and by certain persons in an acquisition as a basis for their exclusion from these rules'
 restrictions. See 17 C.F.R. ? 230.144d-1 (1987) (seller of restricted securities held more
 than two years not regulated as an underwriter); 17 C.F.R. ? 230.145d (1987) (seller of
 securities relating to acquisition, reclassification, merger or consolidation and held more
 than three years not an underwriter).
 18. The preliminary note to SEC Rule 144 under the 1933 Act states this policy
 expressly. See 17 C.F.R. ? 230.144 (1987).
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 to be a potential acquirer.'9
 Thus, a greenmail prohibition that was equally concerned with ex-
 ploitation and entrenchment concerns would treat long- and short-term
 shareholders identically. The antiacquisition forces' concern about ex-
 ploitation would justify restricting non-pro rata premium repurchases
 from short-term holders, and the proacquisition forces' concern about
 entrenchment would justify restricting non-pro rata premium repur-
 chases from long-term holders. However, given that the political bal-
 ance with respect to greenmail favors antitakeover forces, viable
 legislation is nonetheless likely to include a short-term holder
 component.
 2. Drafting Difficulties. - There is a serious problem in reducing the
 concepts underlying the substantial amount and short-term holder
 components to operative language. The adjectives "substantial" and
 "short-term" lack precision; a party seeking to comply with a prohibi-
 tion framed in those terms would confront significant uncertainty over
 whether a particular transaction was covered. For example, without
 more guidance the conceptual underpinnings of these components do
 not allow one to resolve with confidence whether a four percent repur-
 chase involves a substantial amount of stock, or whether someone who
 has held stock for six months is a short-term holder.
 Nor is there an easy way out of the problem. As a matter of admin-
 istrative convenience, it is easy enough to specify a precise triggering
 percentage or minimum holding period. The problem is that any line
 chosen is necessarily arbitrary-it is difficult to imagine a reasoned dis-
 tinction between repurchases of four percent and five percent or be-
 tween six-month or seven-month holders. And precisely because any
 line would be arbitrary, the very drawing of one invites conduct that,
 although substantively of the sort intended to be prohibited, has been
 designed to fall just on the other side.
 This quandary reflects a general problem in regulatory drafting.
 The more specific a prohibition, the less likely it is unintentionally to
 deter socially desirable activity. Uncertainty whether a particular activ-
 ity is covered by the prohibition deters that activity; specificity, because
 it reduces the uncertainty as to coverage, limits the unintended deter-
 rence. The reduction in uncertainty, however, comes at a price. The
 more specific the prohibition, the more likely it is that undesirable be-
 havior, intended to be prohibited, can be structured to fall outside the
 19. To be sure, nongreenmail justifications can be offered for non-pro rata pre-
 mium repurchases from long-term holders. But these reveal a control-related motive on
 their face. Thus, management may wish to prevent such large blocks of stock from pos-
 sibly being acquired by raiders in a future takeover contest. This desire to keep the
 stock from falling into "the wrong hands" has an obvious entrenchment effect. Ex-
 ploitation, by contrast, is not at issue, for management has no fear that the long-term
 shareholders themselves will engage in exploitive behavior.
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 prohibition.20
 Resolution of this drafting dilemma would require balancing the
 amount and desirability of the conduct unintentionally deterred by too
 general a formulation against the amount and undesirability of the con-
 duct unintentionally sanctioned by too specific a formulation. In the
 greenmail context, the relevant balance would compare, among other
 things, the amount of greenmail that a precise, relatively high specifica-
 tion of the substantial amount concept would allow to slip through with
 the justifiable repurchases for general corporate purposes that would
 be prevented (or made more expensive) if the substantial amount com-
 ponent was left more general (or made precise but low).21
 One way around the underinclusive/overinclusive dilemma in the
 greenmail context would be to use the final component of the prohibi-
 tion-that the repurchase be at a premium-to differentiate between
 desirable and undesirable transactions more precisely, but without the
 underinclusiveness that precision typically causes due to efforts to cast
 transactions so that they just avoid the precise boundaries set. Among
 other benefits, such a solution would take some of the pressure off the
 formulation of the substantial amount and short-term holder compo-
 nents. These components then could be drafted so that they swept
 broadly, relying on the precision of the final component to ameliorate
 any overinclusiveness. At the same time, the premium component is
 important in its own right because it focuses on the most critical ele-
 ment in both conceptions-exploitation and entrenchment-of the
 danger of greenmail: the potential acquirer's profit from the repur-
 chase. Thus, the premium component has both derived and direct
 importance.
 20. See Ehrlich & Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. Legal
 Stud. 257 (1974). For an examination of this regulatory dilemma in a different corpo-
 rate context, see Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against De-
 fensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819, 882-87 (1981).
 21. The trade-off would be speculative on both sides. All that would be lost by an
 overinclusive formulation would be access to certain repurchase techniques-non-pro
 rata block purchases-that are claimed to be cheaper, for example, because not subject
 to the issuer tender offer rules under section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of
 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78m (Supp. IV 1987), than the alternatives, like a pro rata offer, that
 would remain available. I am not aware of any data that indicates the frequency of use
 or the cost differential in favor of techniques that would be foreclosed by an overinclu-
 sive formulation. Nor is there any way to tell how much greenmail would take place with
 an underinclusive formulation where the trigger amount was set precisely and at a high
 figure. Data concerning the size of past greenmail transactions that took place in an
 unregulated market would not indicate whether smaller transactions would take place
 once a prohibition of a specified size transaction was in place. So, for example, the fact
 that most significant greenmail purchases have involved more than 5% of the company's
 stock in fact may demonstrate only that a prohibition set at 5%o will result in greenmail
 purchases of 4.9%o.
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 C. The Premium Component: The Core of the Prohibition
 The core of an antigreenmail prohibition is the requirement that
 the repurchase be at a premium. With respect to the fear of exploita-
 tion, unless a premium is paid, there is no incentive for an opportunis-
 tic investor to pursue a greenmail strategy in the first place. With
 respect to the fear of entrenchment, unless a premium is paid, there is
 little incentive for a potential acquirer to abandon an otherwise in-
 tended hostile offer, and therefore little risk that the repurchase will
 entrench management. As a result, the premium definition has the po-
 tential to take the pressure off the formulation of the substantial
 amount and short-term holder components. Any overinclusiveness of
 the formulation of these components may be mitigated by the addi-
 tional requirement that a premium be paid. Moreover, the presence or
 absence of a premium contemplates a dichotomy rather than the con-
 tinuum of the substantiality and short-term components. This compo-
 nent thus holds out the promise of precision that is neither under nor
 overinclusive.
 This happy result depends, of course, on how the term "premium"
 is defined. The most common formulation of a greenmail prohibition
 takes the straightforward but, in the end, naive view that a repurchase
 at a premium is one at a price above the prevailing market price for the
 stock at the time of the repurchase.22 This market-price measure of a
 premium has the advantage of being both precise and readily determi-
 nable. It reflects, however, a misunderstanding of the economics of the
 greenmail process and, as a result, is seriously underinclusive. Because
 the market price at the time of the repurchase already incorporates a
 premium for the greenmailer, a market-price measure of the existence
 of a premium does no more than set a ceiling-a form of price con-
 trol-on the amount of greenmail that can be paid. Within this safe
 harbor, greenmail, in effect, is legalized.
 To see this requires review of the empirical evidence concerning
 the impact on the price of a company's stock when a potential acquirer
 announces that it has made a significant investment in the company
 and, subsequently, when the company announces that it has purchased
 that investment. All existing studies display a consistent pattern. On
 the announcement of the investment, the stock's price increases signifi-
 cantly,23 and the increase is particularly pronounced when the an-
 22. The New York statute takes this approach, N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law ? 513(e)
 (McKinney 1986), as does the Dingell-Markey House bill, H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st
 Sess. ? 5 (1987).
 23. Holderness & Sheehan, Raiders or Saviors? The Evidence on Six Controversial
 Investors, 14J. Fin. Econ. 555, 563 (1985); Mikkelson & Ruback, Corporate Investments
 in Common Stock (Sloan School of Management Working Paper No. 1633-85, Massa-
 chusetts Institute of Technology, Feb. 1985). Technically, the studies show positive ab-
 normal returns, not simple price changes. For an explanation of the difference, see infra
 note 39.
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 nouncement states that the potential acquirer is considering additional
 purchases of the company's stock.24 Empirical studies also uniformly
 show that the price of the company's stock decreases sharply following
 the announcement that the company has purchased the potential ac-
 quirer's stock,25 and that the entire original increase is lost if the com-
 pany is not subsequently the subject of a successful takeover.26
 For our purposes, the critical point is that the market price of the
 company's stock on the date of the repurchase has already increased
 because, as a result of announcement of the initial investment, the mar-
 ket anticipates that a takeover may take place. Payment to the potential
 acquirer of that increased market price reflects precisely the premium
 that defines greenmail, a fact strikingly demonstrated by the drop in
 stock price that follows announcement of the repurchase.
 The current crop of proposed federal greenmail prohibitions27 do
 seem to recognize a part of the problem, but the solutions adopted are
 inadequate. Attempting to pick up some of the price increase that fol-
 lows announcement of the initial investment, these proposals define the
 premium component of the prohibition as a price above market price,
 but then define market price as the average price of the company's
 stock over the thirty days prior to the repurchase.28 As the time be-
 tween the announcement of the initial investment and the repurchase
 increases, however, the averaging formula recaptures less and less of
 the premium implicit in the post-announcement price. For example, if
 the repurchase occurs fifteen days after the announcement of the initial
 investment, then half of the days counted in the average include a post-
 announcement premium. At the limit, if the repurchase takes place
 more than thirty days after announcement of the initial investment, so
 that the market price of the company's stock has reflected the increase
 in price from the announcement over the entire thirty-day period, the
 averaging formula will have no impact at all.29
 24. Mikkelson & Ruback, supra note 23, at Table 4.
 25. Office of the Chief Economist, Securities and Exchange Commission, The Im-
 pact of Targeted Share Repurchases (Greenmail) on Stock Prices 9 (Sept. 11, 1984);
 Bradley & Wakeman, The Wealth Effects of Targeted Share Repurchases, 11 J. Fin.
 Econ. 301, 308 (1983); Dann & DeAngelo, Standstill Agreements, Privately Negotiated
 Stock Repurchases, and the Market for Corporate Control, I IJ. Fin. Econ. 275, 294
 (1983); Holderness & Sheehan, supra note 23; Mikkelson & Ruback, supra note 23.
 26. Bhagat &Jefferis, supra note 3, at 45; Mikkelson & Ruback, supra note 3, at 29.
 27. See S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. ? 8, 133 Cong. Rec. 7601-02 (1987)
 (Proxmire chief sponsor); H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. ? 5 (1987) (Dingell and
 Markey chief sponsors); see also S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. ? 10, 133 Cong. Rec.
 7668-69 (1987) (Sanford sole sponsor).
 28. The Arizona and Minnesota statutes also use a thirty-day averaging approach to
 determine market price. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. ? 10-1204B (Supp. 1987); Minn. Stat.
 Ann. ? 302A.553, subdivision 3 (West 1987).
 29. This result is even more pronounced when the potential acquirer actually has
 made a tender offer for the company's stock. Then the market price of the stock will
 have increased to reflect not just the increased probability that an offer will be made, but
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 Thus, while a precise definition of a greenmail premium is both
 important in itself and relieves pressure on the inherently imprecise
 substantial amount and short-term holder components, a market-price
 measure of this premium is inadequate. The market price at the time of
 repurchase already incorporates a premium, so this measure is itself
 seriously underinclusive. What is needed is a definition of a premium
 that takes into account the stock price rise that results from the an-
 nouncement of the potential acquirer's initial investment.
 II. THREE APPROACHES TO DEFINING A PREMIUM
 Three different solutions to the problem of a post-announcement
 price increase are possible: the use of investor profit as a proxy for the
 existence of premium; a direct statistical measure of the existence and
 size of a premium that accounts for the announcement effect; and an
 end run around the problem by using a measure that, in effect, allows
 the market to determine whether a premium was paid.
 A. A Profit-Based Definition of a Premium
 The problem with the standard market-price definition of a pre-
 mium is that it is underinclusive-the premium implicit in the market
 price is ignored. One solution to the underinclusiveness problem uses
 the presence of investor profits as a proxy for the payment of a pre-
 mium. By analogy to Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
 1934,30 which uses trading profit as a proxy for a different form of illicit
 gain (from trading on inside information), this approach defines a pre-
 mium as any price in excess of what the otherwise covered investor-
 one who is selling a substantial amount of stock not held for the requi-
 site period-paid for the stock to be repurchased.31 Thus, if a potential
 also the terms of the offer on the table. The Proxmire bill copes with this problem by
 specifying that when the person from whom the repurchase is made has commenced a
 tender offer or announced an intention to seek control of the company, market price is
 measured over the thirty trading days preceding the commencement of the offer or the
 announcement of the intent. S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. ? 8h(1), 133 Cong. Rec.
 7601-02 (1987); see also S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1 st Sess. ? 10, 133 Cong. Rec. 7668-69
 (1987) (Sanford bill with similar provision). Dingell-Markey does not deal with this
 problem. H.R. 2172, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. ? 10 (1987).
 An unsystematic review of a number of corporate charter prohibitions suggests that
 a simple market price measure of the existence of a premium, as found in Dingell-
 Markey, is the most common approach taken by voluntary efforts to prohibit greenmail.
 30. 15 U.S.C. ? 78p(b) (1981). Under section 16(b), all profits earned by an officer,
 director or 10% shareholder from the purchase and sale of an issuer's equity securities
 within a six-month period are recoverable by the issuer.
 31. For an example of this approach in a charter amendment prohibition, see Proxy
 Statement of The Perkin-Elmer Corporation 18 (Oct. 12, 1984). Mobil Corporation
 took the point one step further by eliminating the premium requirement entirely. Proxy
 Statement of The Mobil Corporation A-7 (Feb. 22, 1985).
 Congress recently took this approach in the Revenue Act of 1987, Omnibus Budget
 Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, tit. X, ? 10228, adding section 5881 to
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 acquirer buys a substantial amount of stock at ten dollars per share, and
 the company repurchases it shortly thereafter on a non-pro rata basis
 for fifteen dollars, the five dollar profit is treated as an illegal premium.
 A profit-based definition of a premium has two advantages. First,
 it clearly remedies the underinclusiveness problem of a simple market-
 price definition; in most situations, a premium will result in a profit,
 and there is little risk that transactions intended to be prohibited will
 slip through the cracks.32 Second, a profit-based approach has the ad-
 vantage of ease of application. A bright-line, readily observable rule
 makes it easy to know in advance when a repurchase would be
 prohibited.
 Like most bright-line prophylactic rules, however, the avoidance of
 underinclusiveness (and the ease of application) comes at the cost of
 potential overinclusiveness-some transactions may be covered that do
 not pose the twin risks of exploitation and entrenchment that motivate
 prohibiting greenmail. For example, if the price of a company's stock
 has been rising, a profit-based definition of a premium would prohibit
 purchases made as part of a general repurchase program from holders
 who have held too much stock for too short a time-for example, insti-
 tutional investors-otherwise to be excluded from the prohibition by
 the substantial amount or short-term holder components.
 To be sure, this overinclusiveness could be mitigated by tightening
 the terms of the other components of the prohibition:33 by decreasing
 the holding period or increasing the size of the triggering amount. But
 solving the overinclusiveness of a profit-based definition by altering the
 coverage of the other components eliminates one of the factors that
 make the premium component so important to the drafting exercise.
 Recall that one of the hopes for the premium component is that its
 expected precision will relieve the pressure on the definitions of the
 the Internal Revenue Code. Section 5881 imposes a 50% tax on the profit realized from
 the receipt of greenmail, defined as consideration transferred by a corporation to ac-
 quire its stock from any shareholder who has held the stock less than 2 years and who
 has made or threatened to make a tender offer for the stock of the corporation, unless
 the acquisition is pursuant to an offer made on the same terms to all shareholders.
 32. Some underinclusiveness nonetheless remains. One situation that a profit-
 based definition would not cover is that in which the price of the stock has declined and
 the premium-the amount above market price-does not exceed the decline. This
 problem is solved by the direct statistical measure of a premium considered infra notes
 35-41 and accompanying text. For example, consider stock purchased initially at $10
 per share, whose market price declines to $5 per share, and which is repurchased on a
 non-pro rata basis at $8 per share. The $3 premium is not captured, because no profit
 was made on the original stock purchase-in fact, a $2 loss occurred.
 33. Section 16(b), which by its terms applies to all insider equity transactions com-
 pleted within six months, has even more obvious overinclusiveness problems. These
 have been mitigated by Securities and Exchange Commission regulations, see 17 C.F.R.
 240.16b (1987), and by judicial decision, see, e.g., Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental
 Petroleum Corp., 411 U.S. 582, 594 (1973) (section 16b directed only at transactions
 that could not serve as vehicles for trading on inside information).
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 substantial amount and holding period requirements that result from
 their necessarily arbitrary (and therefore unavoidably under or overin-
 clusive) nature. It is hardly a step forward, then, to turn to these com-
 ponents as a means of solving the overinclusiveness of a profit-based
 measure of the premium component.34
 B. A Direct Statistical Definition of a Premium
 The lesson of the underinclusiveness problem with a market-price
 definition of a premium is that, to account for the announcement effect
 of the initial investment, the proper measure of a premium is the differ-
 ence between the market price of the company's stock immediately prior
 to disclosure of the potential acquirer's initial acquisition and the re-
 purchase price.35 Lest this approach seem too easy, however, there are
 34. A profit-based definition can also be underinclusive. In the Revenue Act of
 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, tit. X, ? 10228, Congress seems to have attempted to miti-
 gate the overinclusiveness problem by limiting the application of the section to share-
 holders who have "made or threatened to make a public tender offer for stock of [the
 repurchasing] corporation." The difficulty is that Congress badly overshot the mark,
 ending up with a significantly underinclusive definition. Most important, a would-be
 greenmailer need hardly make an explicit offer or threat to make an offer in order to get
 the point across. At the extreme, if an individual with a reputation as a raider-for ex-
 ample, Boone Pickens or Carl Icahn-announces no more than that he has acquired
 10%o of a company's stock for investment (although he is also considering other alterna-
 tives, including but not limited to acquiring control), no offer has been made or
 threatened, but the message that the company may be in play nonetheless has been
 delivered. Limiting the section's application to settings in which an offer has been ex-
 plicitly made or threatened thus leaves the section's definition of greenmail quite under-
 inclusive.
 Adding, but less significantly, to the section's underinclusiveness, is its limitation to
 situations when a tender offer has been made or threatened. The threat that lends
 credence to an exploitive greenmailer is that to incumbent management's control. But
 the particular means by which that control is threatened is not important. Thus, there
 seems to be little reason to exclude from the ambit of the section shareholders who, for
 example, wage or threaten to wage a proxy fight.
 A final point concerning section 5881 is the wisdom of dealing with issues of corpo-
 rate governance through the mechanism of the federal income tax. Here the issue is not
 only the subterfuge of treating the matter as one of revenue, but the unfortunate quality
 of the work product when the lead drafting committee is without experience in matters
 of corporate governance.
 35. But see SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc., 760 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1985),
 in which the court rejected a similar statistical approach to determining the existence of
 a premium advanced by the Securities and Exchange Commission. In that case, how-
 ever, the inquiry into the existence of a premium took place in a very different context.
 The court in Carter Hawley Hale held that for purposes of determining whether a corpo-
 rate stock repurchase was an issuer tender offer under section 13(e)(1) of the Williams
 Act, the presence of a premium was determined by reference to a simple market price
 measure-the repurchase price less the market price immediately prior to disclosure.
 Id. at 951. The court's conclusion in Carter Hawley Hale, however, was influenced by the
 particular regulatory structure governing issuer tender offers. The terms of Rule 1 3e- 1
 contemplate that some issuer repurchases are not tender offers. A statistical approach
 to determining the existence of a premium likely would result in all issuer repurchases
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 two problems in using the predisclosure price as the basis for determin-
 ing whether the repurchase price includes a premium, one that may
 require retrospective and the other prospective adjustment of the pre-
 disclosure price. It may be necessary, in calculating the premium, to
 adjust the market price that existed immediately prior to disclosure of
 the initial investment to account for the possibility of leakage-in case
 information concerning the initial investment influenced market price
 prior to its formal disclosure. In turn, it also may be necessary to adjust
 the pre-disclosure price to account for post-disclosure movements in
 the price of the company's stock due to changes in market conditions.
 1. Retrospective Adjustments in the Predisclosure Price. - Determining
 the price of the company's stock immediately prior to disclosure of the
 potential acquirer's initial investment should not be difficult when the
 disclosure is required under section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange
 Act of 1934 and when there has been no leakage of the information
 prior to the filing of the 13D Statement.36 But when formal disclosure
 under section 13(d) is not required because the initial investment is of
 less than five percent of the company's stock, there may not be a precise
 announcement date with reference to which the predisclosure price can
 be set. Indeed, even when a 13D Statement is filed, leakage may make
 it difficult to specify the actual predisclosure price37 without examining
 price movements in the company's stock in the days preceding the for-
 mal announcement to determine the market price before it was influ-
 enced by information concerning the initial investor's activities.38
 occurring during a control contest being treated as issuer tender offers, a result arguably
 inconsistent with the regulatory pattern.
 36. Section 13(d) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. 78m(d) (1982), and Rule 13d-1, 17
 C.F.R. ? 240.13d-1 (1987), require that schedule 13D, disclosing, inter alia, the identity
 of the acquirer, the source of its funds, and the purpose of the transaction, be filed
 within 10 days after a person has acquired the beneficial ownership of more than five
 percent of any class of equity security registered under section 12 of the Securities Ex-
 change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. ? 781 (1982). See, e.g., R. Gilson, supra note 2, at
 936-47. The Proxmire and Sanford bills would reduce the five percent threshold to
 three percent and two and one-half percent respectively, and would require filings
 within one and two days after the initial investment. See S. 1323, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
 ? 3a, 133 Cong. Rec. 7601 (1987); S. 1324, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., ? 3a, 133 Cong. Rec.
 7668 (1987). If enacted, these provisions would reduce, though not eliminate, the
 problems associated with wholly undisclosed initial investments and with leakage.
 37. In a related setting, the problem of leakage is significant. A recent study by the
 SEC documents that the combination of market speculation and possible insider trading
 results in significant price and volume increases in target company stock at least 10 days
 prior to the formal announcement of a tender offer. Office of the Chief Economist,
 Securities and Exchange Commission, Stock Trading Before the Announcement of
 Tender Offers: Insider Trading or Market Anticipation? 3 (Feb. 24, 1987). While the
 problem should be much less significant when what is involved is only an initial invest-
 ment rather than a tender offer, it still must be kept in mind.
 38. A standard approach would be to test for abnormal returns in this period. See
 infra note 39.
This content downloaded from 128.59.222.12 on Thu, 02 Jun 2016 01:15:38 UTC
 344 COLUMBIA LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 88:329
 2. Prospective Adjustments in the Predisclosure Price. - After determin-
 ing the predisclosure market price, the next step is comparing it to the
 repurchase price to determine whether a premium was paid. Once
 again, however, there is a danger of both over and underinclusiveness.
 The overinclusiveness problem arises when the company's stock price
 increases between the announcement of the initial investment and the
 repurchase in response to general market movements. A repurchase
 price that exceeds the predisclosure price only as a result of general
 market movements does not include the implicit premium that posed
 the problem with the simple market-price measure of a premium.
 Thus, the predisclosure price must be adjusted upwards to reflect
 postdisclosure general market movements before comparing it to the
 repurchase price.
 Conversely, the underinclusiveness problem arises when the target
 company's stock price decreases between the announcement and the
 repurchase in response to general market movements. Though the re-
 purchase price is absolutely lower than the predisclosure price, an
 implicit premium still will be present if the predisclosure price, now
 reduced to account for postdisclosure general market movements, is
 lower than the repurchase price.
 Thus, adjusting the predisclosure price of the company's stock
 before comparing it to the repurchase price requires the ability to dis-
 tinguish between price changes due to the investor's intial acquisition
 and price changes due to general market movements. Although in
 times of stable prices the task is likely to be straightforward enough,
 simple visual inspection of price patterns will not suffice in more com-
 plex periods when changes in general economic conditions have also
 affected stock prices. In these situations, however, developments in the
 statistical methodology used by financial economists now provide a
 powerful means to distinguish between stock price changes due to new
 information concerning the stock, like a potential acquirer's initial in-
 vestment, and changes that result from general market movements.39
 A direct statistical approach to measuring a premium thus has the
 39. Investigations making use of this methodology are commonly referred to as
 abnormal return (or prediction error) studies. Briefly, such a study uses either the capi-
 tal asset pricing model or the market model to predict what a stock's price would have
 been, taking into account only changes in general economic conditions. When the stock
 does better or worse than predicted, the difference is referred to as a positive or nega-
 tive abnormal return (or prediction error). When such an abnormal return is found to
 coincide with an unanticipated event, like the announcement of a potential acquirer's
 initial investment or the repurchase of that investment, it is possible to infer a causal
 relationship between the event and the abnormal return. Note in this regard that an
 abnormal return is not a measure of whether the stock price went up or down. Rather, it
 is a statement of whether the stock went up or down more or less than it should have.
 Thus, for example, a stock that goes down less than it should have, given the general
 movement in the market, has experienced positive abnormal returns even though the
 stock experienced an absolute price decrease. Similarly, a stock that moves up less than it
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 promise to satisfy the tasks assigned to the measurement of a premium
 in a greenmail prohibition.40 It offers sufficient precision so as not to
 be predictably under or overinclusive itself. As a result, it can serve to
 relieve the pressure on the formulation of the substantial amount and
 short-term holder components. The costs of their inherent imprecision
 are significantly mitigated by the precision of the premium measure.
 The statistical approach is not without drawbacks. First, like any
 statistical measure, it is not perfect; there is a margin for error.4' Sec-
 ond, it requires a small econometric study, a benefit to economic con-
 sultants but a transaction cost for the rest of us. Still, if the need for
 econometrics is the transaction cost of precision, legal bickering over
 under and overinclusiveness (and the beneficial conduct inadvertently
 deterred or detrimental conduct inadvertently sanctioned) are the
 transaction costs of imprecision. The direct statistical approach, there-
 fore, appears to offer real advantages over existing definitions of a
 greenmail premium.
 C. A Postrepurchase Measure of a Premium
 A third approach to measuring the presence of a premium seeks to
 provide the precision offered by the direct statistical approach, but
 without the econometric cost. It finesses the underinclusive-
 ness/overinclusiveness dilemma by, in effect, harnessing the market to
 define greenmail. Recall that the difficulty in defining a premium re-
 sults from the fact that the market price of the stock repurchased in a
 greenmail transaction has a built-in greenmail premium. The first two
 approaches responded by looking back to price levels before disclosure
 of the repurchase, the profit measure by using the potential acquirer's
 cost as a proxy for the predisclosure price and the statistical approach
 by retroactively adjusting the market price at the time of disclosure to
 reflect the impact of the initial investment. In contrast, the third
 approach looks to the market price after the repurchase: repurchases
 are prohibited at a price above the market price of the stock a specified
 should have, given the general movement in the market, has experienced negative abnor-
 mal returns even though it has experienced an absolute price increase.
 For discussions of the use of abnormal return methodology in connection with
 problems similar to measuring a greenmail premium, see, e.g., R. Gilson, supra note 2,
 at 213-38 (1976); Schwert, Using Financial Data to Measure Effects of Regulation, 24
 J.L. & Econ. 121 (1981).
 40. This approach has been recommended by the Reporters of the American Law
 Institute's Corporate Governance Project. See American Law Institute, Principles of
 Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations ? 6.04 and Comment c(2)(b)
 (Advisory Group Draft No. 9, Sept. 16, 1987). This recommendation has not been con-
 sidered by the Council or membership of the American Law Institute, and therefore
 does not represent the position of the Institute. I am one of the Reporters. The views I
 express here, of course, are my own.
 41. For a discussion of the interpretive problems in connection with abnormal re-
 turn studies, see R. Gilson, supra note 2, at 235-38.
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 period-say three days-after public announcement of the intended re-
 purchase transaction.42
 To see how a postrepurchase measure of a premium distinguishes
 greenmail from legitimate repurchase transactions, consider two bodies
 of empirical data. First, as already noted,43 a company's stock price
 typically drops immediately on announcement of a repurchase from a
 potential acquirer to reflect the reduced likelihood of a takeover. Thus,
 by setting as a ceiling on the repurchase price the lower market price
 existing after the announcement of repurchase, it is possible to elimi-
 nate all the potential profit from a greenmail strategy. To be sure, the
 data show that all of the price increase associated with announcement
 of the potential acquirer's initial investment is not eliminated by the
 announcement of the repurchase. What remains reflects the anticipa-
 tion of another offer.44 Although the target company still can pay the
 potential acquirer its proportionate share of this increase under a post-
 repurchase measure of a premium, the same gain is by definition avail-
 able to any shareholder simply by selling in the market following the
 repurchase announcement. In contrast, parity in the prices available to
 the potential acquirer and other shareholders does not exist when, as
 with a simple market-price measure of a premium, the potential ac-
 quirer gets the pre-repurchase announcement price but other share-
 holders get only the lower postrepurchase price.
 The second body of relevant empirical data concerns the price im-
 pact of nongreenmail repurchase transactions. We know that on aver-
 age stock prices rise slightly following announcement of general
 repurchase programs that the market perceives as not involving green-
 mail.45 The explanation offered for this price reaction is that by repur-
 chasing shares, a company credibly signals that it has private
 information indicating that the market price is too low.46 Thus, legiti-
 42. To my knowledge, this approach was originally suggested byJoseph Grundfest.
 To date, it has not been reflected in any proposed federal legislation. At the state level,
 California recently almost adopted a greenmail prohibition that followed this tack,
 prohibiting repurchase of more than three percent of a company's stock not held for
 more than one year at a price in excess of the "post-disclosure market price," defined as
 either the market price of the stock three days after disclosure of the intent to make the
 repurchase, or the average price over the thirty days following disclosure. California
 Senate Bill 542 (Sen. McCorquodale sponsor, 1987). Although passed by both houses
 of the California Legislature, the bill was vetoed by Governor Deukmejian on September
 19, 1987. For a criticism of the Governor's veto message, see Gilson, Odd Veto of Anti-
 Greenmail Measure, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 12, 1987, at Cl, col. 1.
 43. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
 44. This is consistent with the idea that a benefit of greenmailers is to identify the
 opportunity for the rest of the market. See supra note 3.
 45. See, e.g., Masulis, Stock Repurchase by Tender Offer: An Analysis of the
 Causes of Common Stock Price Changes, 35 J. Fin. 305, 316 (1980); Vermaelen, Com-
 mon Stock Repurchases and Market Signalling: An Empirical Study, 9J. Fin. Econ. 139,
 179 (1981).
 46. This explanation, in turn, suggests that the issuance of new stock should result
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 mate repurchase transactions would not be adversely affected by a post-
 repurchase measure of a premium because there would be no price
 drop as a result of the announcement of a nongreenmail repurchase.
 The most intriguing part of this approach is that the solution relies
 on the market to identify greenmail. When the market believes that an
 announced repurchase involves greenmail, the stock price will drop to
 eliminate the greenmailer's built-in gain. When the market does not
 believe the repurchase involves greenmail, the stock price will not be
 adversely affected.
 This reliance on a market determination of greenmail to eliminate
 a premium has a number of interesting advantages. First, the approach
 avoids the underinclusive/overinclusive dilemma because the market
 makes an individualized determination of whether a premium exists in
 every case. When it concludes that the market price prior to announce-
 ment of the intent to repurchase incorporated a premium based on an-
 ticipation that the potential acquirer would make an offer, the price
 drops to eliminate the premium. In this sense, the approach is less a
 rule, with a rule-like bias in favor of ease of application at the expense
 of an individualized determination in each case, than a standard where
 the focus is on the facts of the particular case.47
 The second advantage flows from the first. Typically, an important
 part of the cost of the individualized inquiry associated with a standard
 is the cost of the inquiry itself. Because the rule/standard debate gen-
 erally assumes that the decisionmaker will be a court, the open-ended
 flexibility of a standard imposes additional litigation expenses as com-
 pared to an easily (if not mechanically) applied rule.48 Because a mar-
 ket determination of the existence of a premium and its resulting
 elimination if one is found is essentially self-executing, there are almost
 no administrative costs associated with this approach.
 Finally, because both the determination of whether a premium ex-
 ists and, if so, of the remedy in effect imposed, is precise, a market
 determination approach succeeds in taking the pressure off the formu-
 lation of the substantial amount and short-term holder components of
 the greenmail prohibition. The difficulty presented by both compo-
 nents is that if underinclusiveness is avoided by specifying a size of
 purchase trigger low enough, and holding period short enough, that no
 greenmail purchases will slip through, the net may also catch some
 in a comparable decline in the value of already outstanding stock because the sale sig-
 nals that the company believes the presale stock price was too high. The data are con-
 sistent with this conclusion as well. See Ascquith & Mullins, Equity Issues and Offering
 Dilution, 15 J. Fin. Econ. 61, 65 (1986); Mikkelson & Partch, Valuation Effects of Secur-
 ity Offerings and the Issuance Process, 15J. Fin. Econ. 31, 44 (1986); Schipper & Smith,
 A Comparison of Equity Carve-Outs and Equity Offerings: Share Price Effects and Cor-
 porate Restructurings, 15 J. Fin. Econ. 153, 155 (1986).
 47. See M. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 15-63 (1987).
 48. The most familiar criticism of this advantage of a rule formulation in other con-
 texts is that the ease of application is a myth. Id.
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 nongreenmail transactions that are not intended to be prohibited. The
 market determination approach solves this problem because even if the
 size of purchase or holding period requirements unintentionally cover
 a nongreenmail transaction in a particular case, the market determina-
 tion of the existence of a premium nonetheless will effectively exempt
 the transaction from the prohibition. Because the market will recog-
 nize that the transaction is not greenmail, the stock price will not drop
 following announcement of the repurchase and the prohibition will
 have no effect on the terms of the transaction; the price three days later
 will not have been altered as a result of the announcement.
 One might respond to this analysis by arguing that the post-repur-
 chase measure of a premium is not costless to a seller inadvertently
 included in the broadened net of the nonpremium components of a
 prohibition that this approach allows. This approach does not distin-
 guish between declines during the three-day postannouncement wait-
 ing period caused by general market movements and declines that
 occur in response to greenmailing; it would prohibit transactions in
 both cases. Hence, the seller must bear the risk that the market price
 will drop as a result of general market movements during the three-day
 postannouncement waiting period, and should that occur, that the
 transaction then could be completed only at the lower price. In fact,
 however, the parties could easily negotiate arrangements to reallocate
 this risk.
 First, the seller could insist that its obligation to close the repur-
 chase transaction be conditioned on the absence of a drop in stock
 price. Thus, there would be no risk that the seller would be forced to
 complete the sale at a different price than anticipated. That still would
 leave the risk that the transaction would go uncompleted, with both
 sides losing the benefit of their bargain, if the stock price dropped dur-
 ing the three-day post-transaction period because of general market
 movements. However, even this risk can be eliminated through the use
 of options on market indices, thereby leaving the seller hedged with
 respect to a stock price drop due to general market movements.49
 49. There would be a cost to acquiring the options; however, it will always be a
 small fraction of the value of a transaction of the size that meets the substantial amount
 trigger.
 It is also possible that the stock will drop during the three-day period because of
 new unfavorable firm-specific information. Where this information was known to the
 repurchasing company at the time of the repurchase agreement (that is, before the
 three-day post-announcement period), standard common-law and securities fraud reme-
 dies provide protection if the seller suffers damages as a result of not completing the
 transaction. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
 denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). The cost of the market determination approach that is
 more difficult to eliminate is the seller's loss of the benefit of his bargain when new
 company-specific information arises during the three-day period and the company had
 no prior knowledge of it, such as the unexpected loss of a major contract or customer.
 Even in these cases, however, one can imagine hedging strategies that may mitigate the
 problem. If there is an option market in the company's stock, the seller may hedge
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 Thus, examining the postrepurchase behavior of a company's share
 price appears to offer an accurate and inexpensive way to identify and
 prohibit the payment of greenmail premiums.50
 III. OVERCOMING OBJECTIONS TO A STATUTORY APPROACH
 The development of a number of solutions to the problems of
 drafting a workable greenmail prohibition does not exhaust the techni-
 cal objections to proposed formulations, including the three discussed.
 One objection-that any prohibition can be avoided by clever lawyers
 and investment bankers-expresses skepticism that a prohibition can
 be effective regardless of how artfully drawn. A second objection-that
 some companies voluntarily have adopted prohibitions on greenmail
 while others have not demonstrates that no legislative action is called
 for-expresses a preference for a private ordering solution.
 A. The Clever Lawyer and Investment Banker Objection:
 Devising Greenmail Equivalents
 A familiar objection to proposals to prohibit greenmail is that
 clever lawyers or investment bankers will devise ways to accomplish the
 prohibited result-paying a potential acquirer a premium to go away-
 that will fall outside the boundaries of the prohibition regardless of
 how the prohibition is formulated. In other words, the objection is
 that any prohibition inevitably will be underinclusive. For example,
 Chesebrough-Pond recently repurchased Carl Icahn's five percent
 holding at market price, but augmented the implicit premium repre-
 sented by this inflated market price by also purchasing an Icahn-owned
 company at a price regarded as substantially above its fair market
 value.5' Indeed, the concept can be extended to eliminate the target
 company's repurchase entirely by recasting the transaction so that the
 potential acquirer sells his shares on the market simultaneously with
 the closing of the advantageously priced side transaction. One can
 even eliminate completely any sale of the potential acquirer's stock sim-
 ply by coupling the favorable side transaction with a standstill agree-
 against price drops due to both general market movements and new company-specific
 information by purchasing a put option on the company's stock following disclosure of
 the repurchase (although if the repurchase is too large, this approach may still leave a
 "deductible" in the insurance provided by the purchase of puts). If there is not an op-
 tion market, other hedging techniques may provide some protection against firm-spe-
 cific events. For example, to the extent that any unfavorable company-specific
 information would affect the repurchasing company's competitive position, a hedging
 investment in the company's competitors may provide some protection.
 50. In this setting, the information on which the market operates is widely distrib-
 uted and of low cost. Thus, the market can be expected to reflect the information
 quickly and accurately. See Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
 70 U. Va. L. Rev. 549 (1984).
 51. See Jaenicke, supra note 6, at B-li.
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 ment.52 If merely restructuring the form of the greenmail transaction
 serves to avoid the prohibition, the objection goes, the game simply is
 not worth the candle.
 The problem posed by the clever lawyer and investment banker
 objection is endemic to business law. The boundaries of most regula-
 tory systems are expressed by reference to transactional form: such
 regulation by its terms applies only to transactions that have a specified
 structure.53 But the drawing of the regulation is only the first move in a
 multi-round strategic game.54 The objects of the regulation then get
 the next move. And so long as the form of the transaction can be al-
 tered without significantly altering either the transaction's cash flow or
 the associated risk, a vast number of transactional permutations are
 available that maintain the substance of the transaction while causing
 its form to fall outside the boundaries of the regulation. In the game's
 next round, courts determine whether to respect the form in which the
 parties have cast their transaction or to draw upon a doctrine, like the
 de facto merger doctrine in corporate law55 or the form versus sub-
 stance and step transaction doctrines in tax law,56 that looks past the
 formal terms of the transaction to its substance.
 The same response is available to courts if confronted with efforts
 to create greenmail equivalents that fall outside the terms of the prohi-
 bition. The substance of a greenmail transaction is far less malleable
 than its form. To satisfy the requirements of both the potential ac-
 quirer and the target company, the transaction, whatever its form, must
 both provide the potential acquirer a premium and restrict his ability
 subsequently to mount a control contest. However many permutations
 in which the form of the transaction may be cast, these elements of
 substance cannot be altered without significantly changing what the
 52. The standstill agreement, inter alia, would give the company a right of first
 refusal to purchase the shares, a prohibition on further acquisitions or other efforts to
 affect control of the company, and an obligation at least to vote the shares in the same
 proportion as all other shares are voted (or, more aggressively, as management directs).
 See, e.g., Bartlett & Andrews, The Standstill Agreement: Legal and Business Considera-
 tions Underlying a Corporate Peace Treaty, 62 B.U. L. Rev. 143 (1982); Note, The
 Standstill Agreement: A Case of Illegal Vote Selling and a Breach of Fiduciary Duty, 93
 Yale LJ. 1093, 1094-95 (1984).
 53. For example, both the Internal Revenue Code and many corporation statutes
 treat acquisitions that take the form of a statutory merger dramatically differently than
 an acquisition that takes the form of an asset acquisition, even though in substance they
 are virtually identical. See I.R.C. ? 368(a)(1)(A) (1982) and I.R.C. ? 368(a)(1)(C)
 (1982); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, ? 262 (1983).
 54. This view of the regulation of business activities is developed in Gilson, Value
 Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 Yale LJ. 239, 296-98
 (1984).
 55. See R. Gilson, supra note 2, at 533-80.
 56. See, e.g., Chirelstein, Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoid-
 ance, 77 Yale LJ. 440 (1968); Chirelstein & Lopata, Recent Developments in the Step-
 Transaction Doctrine, 60 Taxes 970 (1982).
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 transaction accomplishes. Indeed, because the substance of both the
 transaction and the prohibition is clear, the courts should have an eas-
 ier time identifying greenmail equivalent transactions than they do in
 other areas where judicial doctrine has been developed to back up for-
 mally expressed regulatory systems.57
 B. The Private Ordering Objection: Companies Can Act of Their Own
 The second objection challenges the need for any legislation at all.
 Between January 1984 and February 1987, some seventy publicly
 traded companies voluntarily adopted greenmail prohibitions by char-
 ter amendment.58 If companies are free to prohibit greenmail on their
 own, and if some companies do so while others do not, the implication
 is that a greenmail prohibition is not uniformly desirable. If that is the
 case, the objection goes, there is no justification for imposing a uniform
 legislative prohibition on all companies.
 The proper response to this private ordering objection is not that
 legislation is preferable to private ordering, but that, in this context,
 legislation is necessary to facilitate private ordering. Recall that one of
 the two concerns supporting the consensus in favor of prohibiting
 greenmail is a fear of management entrenchment. To this, add the
 problem of management control of the agenda. As a general rule, the
 board of directors must approve any amendment to the company's arti-
 cles of incorporation, including one prohibiting greenmail.59 Thus,
 unless management offers them the opportunity, shareholders cannot
 prohibit greenmail. When one of the points of a greenmail prohibition
 is to prevent management from entrenching itself, one can have little
 confidence in the outcome of a private ordering process that gives man-
 agement the power to veto a prohibition.
 Put somewhat differently, the objection is driven by the fact that
 some companies have not voluntarily prohibited greenmail. But this
 outcome does not necessarily mean that a prohibition would not be
 desirable. The failure to prohibit greenmail is explainable either by
 management's good faith determination that a prohibition would not
 serve shareholder interests or by management's bad faith desire to re-
 tain this entrenchment tool.
 In contrast to the limited role for shareholders in a purely private
 ordering process, legislation establishing a greenmail prohibition as the
 57. For an application of this approach to other regulatory systems, see R. Gilson,
 supra note 2, at 533-80 (de facto merger doctrine); Gilson, Scholes & Wolfson, Taxa-
 tion and the Dynamics of Corporate Control: The Uncertain Case for Tax Motivated
 Acquisitions, in Knights, Raiders and Targets: The Impact of Hostile Takeovers (J.
 Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Ackerman eds., forthcoming Oxford University Press,
 1988) (income taxation of acquisitions).
 58. Jaenicke, supra note 6, at B-12.
 59. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code ? 905 (West 1977); Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 ? 242
 (1983); Revised Model Business Corp. Act ? 10.03 (1984).
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 default rule serves to effectuate the goal of private ordering-allowing
 individual companies to vary the rule governing greenmail to meet
 their individual circumstances-by assuring that the outcome of private
 ordering actually reflects shareholder preferences. All formulations of
 a prohibition currently contemplate that greenmail can be paid if share-
 holders approve it. Thus, where management believes it desirable to
 repurchase the stock of a potential acquirer, the prohibition does not
 prevent the repurchase; it only requires shareholder approval. With
 this statutory structure, management's costless access to the company's
 proxy machinery facilitates putting the matter to the shareholders, and
 the requirement of shareholder approval acts as a check on the use of
 repurchases as a means of entrenchment.60 So understood, a legisla-
 tively imposed greenmail prohibition is not inconsistent with a prefer-
 ence for private ordering. Rather, it functions to create a
 decisionmaking structure within the corporation that more effectively
 assures a private ordering role for shareholders.
 CONCLUSION
 In this essay, I have shown that the most familiar formulation of
 the prohibition on greenmail-focusing on repurchases above market
 price-serves not to prohibit greenmail, but to legalize it by creating a
 safe harbor within which it safely can be paid. I then surveyed three
 alternative formulations which solve this problem with differing levels
 of success. Identifying premiums by measuring sellers' profits is
 straightforward, yet has the potential to prohibit many legitimate stock
 purchases. Direct statistical measurements can distinguish greenmail
 premiums from price changes reflective of general market trends,
 though at the cost of introducing econometric modeling into regulatory
 enforcement. A still more promising approach is to identify greenmail
 as those repurchases that provoke declines in a stock's market price,
 60. A different private-ordering issue is whether shareholders could elect to opt out
 of the statutory prohibition entirely should they believe that their company would be
 better off if management had the discretion to pay greenmail without the need for spe-
 cific shareholder authorization for each repurchase. The general issue of limits on
 shareholders' ability to adopt corporate governance rules that differ from the governing
 statute is beside the point because the analysis and result is precisely the same whether
 the issue is approving a particular repurchase or opting out of the prohibition entirely.
 A private ordering solution is enhanced when, as put by the Reporters of the American
 Law Institute's Corporate Governance Project, "in corporate law the default rule should
 favor the party with less effective access to the proxy process." American Law Institute,
 Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations 152 (Advisory
 Group Draft No. 8, Mar. 10, 1987). For a discussion of the issues posed in defining the
 boundaries of permissible opting out of rules specified in the corporate statute, see J.
 Coffee, Theories of the Corporation and the Problem of Remedies: What Role for Pri-
 vate Ordering? (Columbia University Law School Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 27,
 Apr. 1987).
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 recognizing the end of a prospective takeover. This allows for case-by-
 case evaluation by the market of the presence of greenmail.
 Each of these approaches, moreover, would withstand attempts at
 evasion, for courts would have little trouble identifying the substance of
 a greenmail transaction. Finally, a statutory prohibition would enhance
 private ordering by ensuring that shareholders have the final say in all
 such transactions. Thus, properly drafted, a statute prohibiting green-
 mail can curb both exploitation and management entrenchment, meet-
 ing the concerns of both sides in the continuing debate over corporate
 takeovers.
 More generally, the problem with the market price formulation re-
 sults from the fact that its drafters did not understand the underlying
 financial economics of the transaction they sought to regulate. Over
 the last few years, a large body of empirical studies have been con-
 ducted on the operation of the market for corporate control and on the
 consequences of particular activities that affect control contests. This is
 an extraordinary change from the state of affairs ten years ago when
 lawyers debated the effects of different actions and alternative regula-
 tory responses based only on what might be styled a lawyer's definition
 of data: the plural of anecdote. The lesson from this is straightfor-
 ward. We cannot regulate-indeed, to avoid putting the cart before the
 horse, we cannot even determine whether regulation is appropriate-if
 we do not understand the underlying substance of the activity that con-
 cerns us.6' Where that activity is part of the capital market, the task
 calls for the cooperation of lawyers and financial economists. Neither
 group is likely to do an acceptable job on its own.
 61. This theme is developed in detail in Gilson, supra note 2.
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